Building attack scenarios through integration of complementary alert correlation method

Conference

P. Ning, D. Xu, C. G. Healey, R. St. Amant
10th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS '04), 2004, pp. 97-111

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APA Click to copy
Ning, P., Xu, D., Healey, C. G., & Amant, R. S. (2004). Building attack scenarios through integration of complementary alert correlation method. In 10th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS '04) (pp. 97–111).

Chicago/Turabian Click to copy
Ning, P., D. Xu, C. G. Healey, and R. St. Amant. “Building Attack Scenarios through Integration of Complementary Alert Correlation Method.” In 10th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS '04), 97–111, 2004.

MLA Click to copy
Ning, P., et al. “Building Attack Scenarios through Integration of Complementary Alert Correlation Method.” 10th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS '04), 2004, pp. 97–111.

BibTeX Click to copy

@conference{p2004a,
  title = {Building attack scenarios through integration of complementary alert correlation method},
  year = {2004},
  pages = {97-111},
  author = {Ning, P. and Xu, D. and Healey, C. G. and Amant, R. St.},
  booktitle = {10th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS '04)}
}

Abstract

Several alert correlation methods were proposed in the past several years to construct high-level attack scenarios from low-level intrusion alerts reported by intrusion detection systems (IDSs). These correlation methods have different strengths and limitations; none of them clearly dominate the others. However, all of these methods depend heavily on the underlying IDSs, and perform poorly when the IDSs miss critical attacks. In order to improve the performance of intrusion alert correlation and reduce the impact of missed attacks, this paper presents a series of techniques to integrate two complementary types of alert correlation methods: (1) those based on the similarity between alert attributes, and (2) those based on prerequisites and consequences of attacks. In particular, this paper presents techniques to hypothesize and reason about attacks possibly missed by IDSs based on the indirect causal relationship between intrusion alerts and the constraints they must satisfy. This paper also discusses additional techniques to validate the hypothesized attacks through raw audit data and to consolidate the hypothesized attacks to generate concise attack scenarios. The experimental results in this paper demonstrate the potential of these techniques in building high-level attack scenarios and reasoning about possibly missed attacks.